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2. In PIDOW-Gulbarga the prevalent thinking that is expressed in documents governing the project has been that plans will be "implemented through functional groups". MYRADA’s observations from its experience in PIDOW as well as in its other projects have been that this approach tends to extend control of Government and the NGO on the process of implementation. The PIDOW approach to "implement through the groups" has been justified by the claim that the treatment plan has been prepared in participation with the people, hence there should be no changes during implementation; further, the concern is that any divergence from the approved plan during implementation would make supervision by Government staff (who have to assess work done in the field and allocate payments) difficult. Besides, throwing the responsibility of decision making on the lower level staff who are not accustomed to deal with divergence from the plan, any change, would leave the field level staff open to criticism by senior officials who evaluate their performance on the basis of the plan. There is also an underlying cultural block which makes it difficult for the "technical experts" who have had input in the treatment plan to accept any change. There is the claim that the National and State planning norms based on long practices have been used in planning. MYRADA staff in PIDOW on their part have insisted that the plan must be implemented "through groups" in accordance with the strategy that was expressed in the agreements signed by the partners. An analysis of the implementation process, however, during the past year indicates clearly that implementation "through the groups" did not foster participation by the people, since power remained with the intervening staff. What is emerging is that unless the peoplesinstitutions take control of implementing the plan with the support - if required - from outsiders, the degree of usefulness of the work done from the peoples point of view and the chances of sustainability will both decrease. In PIDOW while the DLDB’s role is to provide technical support, MYRADA’s role is to strengthen peoples’ institutions with the skills and resources to manage their watershed. It is these institutions which should implement the treatment plan; they should be free to call on the services of Government or NGOs - or to refuse them if considered inappropriate or unnecessary. It is true that PIDOW has not had enough time to work out a creative synergy between the intervening partners since the collaboration with the DLDB is fairly recent (1˝ years). There are also certain feelings, some based on experiences and others on perceptions which are obstructing the emergence of a combined effort which is required if the people take control of implementation. While Government staff at higher levels feel that the MYRADA staff are taking undue credit for the work and that technically they are weak, the MYRADA staff feel that the gap between what is said about participation at higher levels of Government and what actually happens on the field is larger; they also feel that while the technical input of Government in planning is high, at the field level it is poor and often the people have the skills required to carry out works on their own; finally they feel that according to the roles which were allotted to the partners, it is the PIDOW-MYRADA staff who should play a major role in fostering participatory approaches and strategies; however, the trend is for non technical staff at higher levels of Government to take on the role of participatory experts; this results in conflicting messages. Many of these perceptions may be blown out of proportion due to personalities, but there are surely perceptions on both sides that are justified. Ironically, present underlying perceptions seem to indicate that while the DLDB staff, atleast at higher levels seem to be of the opinion that they are capable of introducing participatory approaches, the NGO feels that people are quite capable of implementing the treatment plan and that intervention by DLDB during the implementation phase is not only unnecessary but is also obstructing the participatory process. It is therefore necessary that, for power to pass over to peoples institutions, the intervening partners realise the need to collaborate in order to support the emergence of appropriate peoples institutions. A clear shift is required to transfer power (access and control) from those involved in the planning stage to peoples institutions during the implementation phase. But to which institutions will power be transferred and over which activities or resources does this power extend? There are sufficient emerging trends of peoples groupings in PIDOW which can provide the beginnings of an answer and form the basis for a strategy totransfer power to people and to define the scope of this power. As far as PIDOW is concerned, several peoples groups within each micro watershed have emerged during the past 2-3 years. These groups resemble the Credit Management Groups in all MYRADA projects. Besides managing credit they also take on roles in response to local needs. In PIDOW, for instance, several groups have taken on lease private fallow lands as well as Revenue wastelands, which they have protected and from which they have earned profits from harvesting and selling traditional fodder grasses. Several groups have also been involved in implementing the treatment plan in the fields of their members. As yet no single organisation has emerged to take over the implementation of the treatment plan in one micro or sub-watershed. There are reasons for this which will be discussed below; however, the absence of one apex society covering the entire watershed need not obstruct the handing over of power to the people. The ‘lead role’ in the implementation has been allotted to the DLDB field level staff who are expected to implement the plan "through the groups"; this perception has to change. In the PIDOW area itself there are Micro Watersheds where the DLDB did not play a role in the implementation of the treatment plan. The implementation was carried out largely by the peoples groups in consultation with one another but with considerable input from MYRADA staff who played a role in solving disputes, marking and assessing work done for payment. Implementation in these micro watersheds however went ahead much faster and without any delays and misunderstandings. There was also no obvious difference in the technical quality of the structures constructed in these watersheds and of others supervised by the DLDB field level staff. The question that arises therefore is what exactly is the technical value added during the implementation phase by the field level technical staff of DLDB? If there is no value added, are they required at all? Observations of land development works carried out by people in MYRADA projects near Kadiri, Bangarpet and Huthur where no technical support was provided by DLDB and minimal by MYRADA also show that the quality of structures is high. The people have traditional skills in terracing and bunding which are adequate; it is only where major structures like weirs are concerned that outside expertise is required. On the other hand, in areas where the DLDB is not involved the technical quality of plans and maps prepared during the preparatory phase is low. What was lacking till recently in PIDOW watersheds where DLDB and MYRADA are working are Apex organisations that could legitimately claim to represent all the groups in the watersheds and which in turn could demand the right to control the implementation phase. During the past 6-9 months however, in the newer watersheds, several groups which have been managing savings and providing credit, have come together to form Apex Societies. The original assumption made by MYRADA was that there would be one Apex Society for each sub-watershed, but the present pattern emerging does not bear this out. Left to take the initiative, the families in Margutti Doddahalla sub-watershed have formed 2 Apex Societies, one comprising 6 credit groups and the other 7. One Apex Society covers families with lands on the right of the main drainage running through the sub watershed and the other Apex Society covers those with lands on the left. The largerfarmers who own lands (on both sides) have formed a group of their own. There are also other sub watersheds in PIDOW where a similar pattern is emerging namely where there are 2 or more Apex Societies in one Sub watershed. The two Apex Societies in Margutti Doddahalla sub-watershed are formed by 2-3 representatives selected by each credit management group. It was observed earlier that there is no sub-watershed where only one Apex Society has emerged covering the entire area. There are clear indications that all the groups in these sub watersheds do not feel confident as yet to form a single apex society for the entire sub-watershed. The groups comprising families from the weaker sections are particularly apprehensive that their freedom and rights may be tampered with by the groups with richer and more influential members. An interesting development in PIDOW highlights this apprehension by the groups whose members are from the weaker sections of society. When the formation of Apex Groups in a sub-watershed was discussed with the people, the groups of tribals who lived mainly in the upper reaches of several micro watersheds, decided to join together to form an Apex group which consisted only of tribal groups from several micro watersheds. The tribal groups decided not to join the other groups within their own micro watershed because, while on one hand they felt a closer affinity with other tribal groups, on the other hand they were apprehensive that they would be marginalised by other groups in their micro watersheds. From its experience with Apex societies of credit groups, MYRADA expects that the tribal groups in the micro watershed will finally agree to form an Apex Society with the other micro watershed groups, but after they have built up a level of self-reliance and confidence as a result ofnetworking with groups with which they have an affinity. The intervening NGO meanwhile has a role to ensure that the smaller credit groups especially those with weaker members are supported to attain a degree of self reliance in terms of daily needs and unexpected demands and the confidence and skills to negotiate effectively to protect their rights and their share in the benefits of the programme. Even where an Apex Society emerges, the NGO should ensure that while it supports the emerging identity of the Apex Society, the latter should not undermine the strength of the credit groups. In the Bangarpet Watershed the families in the Apex Society have continued to depend on their respective credit groups for loans and there are sufficient indicators to assume that if they require to spend time maintaining the conservation structures on their fields they will be able to borrow from their respective credit groups to meet their daily consumption needs; in other words the pressure to migrate for wages will be eased, allowing them to stay in the area and work on their lands if required. What roles can these emerging Apex Societies be expected to assume? The emergence of Apex Societies in various watershed programmes of MYRADA has been a relatively recent experience; they have not played any significant role as yet in watershed management. At this stage therefore, it may be useful to reflect on the process through which they have emerged in order to identify certain guidelines both tentative and flexible which may help to identify the roles of apex societies in watersheds. Some of the roles that these Apex Societies could assume in watersheds have already been taken up by the credit groups in PIDOW. For example, it is the credit groups which have leased fallow land from private farmers, they have also taken over Revenue wastelands and degraded forest lands; all these lands have been protected and developed. The members have been paid a daily wage to harvest grasses which have been sold as fodder at a considerable profit. It will therefore be counter productive to hand over these roles to the Apex Societies, it would lead to a conflict situation which the powerful farmers would relish as it would help them to re-establish their influence which is diminishing, as the credit groups gather strength. It seems appropriate for the present to limit the role of the Apex Societies in Micro Watersheds to implementing the treatment plan. This is why it is advisable to call them "Watershed Implementation Committees" rather than "Watershed Management Committees" as the latter name indicates a much wider role. It is difficult to predict what patterns may emerge in a year or two (they will probably vary with each Watershed) but the credit groups must not be weakened in the process. In Bangarpet the Apex Society(7) managing one watershed has emerged through a different process. There were already 3 functioning credit groups in the micro watershed when farmers who owned lands along a large ravine decided to form a watershed Apex Society to treat the ravine. These farmers were members of different credit groups. What brought them together was the fact that they own land in an area where the potential for quick returns was the highest. Though they have contributed part of the funds wages to the watershed group, they continue to rely on their original credit groups for other loans. They have also not decided what to do with the common fund that has accumulated with the watershed committee. As treatment work progress to the fields of other farmers in the micro watershed they are being accepted as members of the watershed committee. However, as observed earlier; the members of the watershed society continue to depend on their credit groups for any joint activity other than the Watershed implementation programme. Analysing the above experiences and the emerging needs in the growth of Apex Societies in Watersheds, the role of the Watershed Implementation Committee (WIC) could be described as follows :
These are possible roles of the WIC; some have already been considered by the Apex Societies while others need to be presented by MYRADA to these societies and assessed by their members for their relevance and importance. Though in every watershed the WIC may not take on all these roles (monitoring the work done for example is often delegated to the credit groups), every effort must be made by MYRADA staff to ensure that the WICs have the power to control the implementation process even if others point out that they may make mistakes due to inexperience.
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PIDOW Participative
Integrated Development of Watersheds. |