3. It promotes self help before any investment from outside is made. MYRADA learnt that people (no matter how poor) have to take a first step. This could be a decision to save and lend to members of the group, to manage a resource like a fallow plot, protect it and share the produce, or to undertake a common activity. It is not enough if this step is a symbolic one; it must continue over a period, to build up a habit of working together in new roles and to develop into a simple system of management. This group effort should not be perceived as a leverage to get larger benefits from outside. It should focus on building mutual trust among the members and determination to stand on their own feet. If they see the NGO/Government intervention as an opportunity to extract benefits, the process of sustained empowerment will not take off. To agitate for and to demand community infrastructure from Government is a sound strategy, but to use the strategy to demand individual benefits before building up peoples confidence to lead the demand and their ability to sustain it, tends to undermine the process of self-reliance, to perpetuate the existing culture of depending on Government to lead to a situation where people have to accept official programmes even though they may not be able to maintain the assets.

From an exhaustive analysis of the credit needs of the poor, MYRADA learnt that their dependence on moneylenders for consumption needs was a major factor that perpetuated their dependence. As long as the poor depend on others for their essentials, they have no bargaining power and are unable to participate in an effective manner as civic groups in public life; it makes them vulnerable to vested interests and political promises. This is the reason why MYRADA guided groups to undertake the responsibility of managing credit to meet their essential needs including consumption requirements. A small example will indicate how relations of dependence distort participative processes. Several years ago a low cost drinking water system was planned by a village in Mysore District. The people discussed the design and distribution of water points; agreement was reached without much discussion. MYRADA staff noticed that the distribution plan favoured the richer sections, but went along with the peoples plan. Five years later the drinking water system was upgraded. This time the debate on design, distribution and management was loud and long. The poorer sectors had found a voice. The reason for the change was obvious to the intervenors. Three SHGs managing credit had emerged in the village during the interim; people had acquired a degree of self reliance, and with it, the independence required to express their opinion and to ensure that a far more equitable distribution system of water was adopted.

4. It does not rush into offering opportunities for micro enterprises. The pressure exerted from some intervenors to move quickly-- even during the first year of the group's life -- into off-farm micro enterprises which require an investment of over Rs.10,000/- by a group member does not take into account that the poor do not have the capacity to absorb such large investments early in the process. Besides, the linkages and the infrastructure required are also not adequate or in place so early in the project. Large loans to individual members in the early stages also undermines group cohesion. MYRADA's experience indicates that where such large loans were advanced it was usually to members who were not really poor but had managed to join the group. The practice of formulating `viable' projects also tends towards large loans. What is "viable" to outsiders need not be and is often not manageable by the poor. They usually start with investment in an activity which in itself may not be viable but which they can manage without withdrawing from other activities and without any decline in their daily income. Large project investments demand their full time involvement without providing a reliable daily return. They are therefore unwilling to give up the livelihood activities on which they relied on all along. Their strategy is to gradually build up this investment to reach a level at which it is viable in itself, manageable and capable of providing their daily needs.

A study of the pattern of loans given by groups indicates that after a period where the number of consumption loans is high - often 60% to 80%, the number of loans for trading and services begins to rise. People are more confident to enter these fields where turnover is rapid, even daily (which they prefer) and where they feel comfortable and in control. It is only after 2-3 years that some members opt to take large loans for off-farm micro enterprises. Intervenors therefore need to invest in infrastructure which supports services and trading before investing in infrastructure for off-farm micro enterprises. It is also noticed that people move easily into non-traditional areas in trading and service industries than in the field of off-farm micro enterprises.

5. it maintains a constant concern for equity with regard to the poor, women, children, tribals and for development that is environmentally sustainable which can be considered as equity with a reference to future generations. The effectiveness of MYRADA's delivery system to reach the poor is recognised even by Government. But MYRADA has learnt that working directly with individuals has several and sometimes severe limitations. The impact of investment is often not what was planned, as part of the resources are used for consumption; the impact has seldom been sustainable since the investment required a level of support and management higher than they were capable of. Those among the poor who managed to take off on their own were usually those who had the skills, confidence and network required and needed only finance. Loans were not repaid to MYRADA, hence credit operations were not sustainable; defaulters failed to attend training sessions and stopped relating to project staff. The objective of achieving equity in a sustainable manner cannot be c achieved by establishing an effective delivery system to reach the poor, it includes a strategy to build their capacity, to support the growth of their institutions and to establish the necessary linkages and networks to provide the basis of empowerment and sustained access to resources.

If the structure of the institutions required to manage the resource in question incorporates adequate checks and balances to ensure equal access to an control of resources by the poor, it is easier for the objective of equity to be achieved and sustained inspite of the constant pressure from society driven by market forces to marginalise it. This is the reason why th  credit groups which are homogeneous, small and based on affinity relationships of the poor and hence exclude the well-to- do, do, have a greater potential to achieve and maintain the objective of equity within the group than larger groups which are not homogeneous in terms of economic power and status. There are several example of initiatives to form groups, especially in forestry and watershed management programmes which have resulted in the formation of large groups which are not economically or socially homogeneous. Such groups have to cope with larger farmers who need to be brought into the management of the resource without compromising the rights of the . MYRADA has been able to introduce a strategy whereby the landless and the poor in the watershed form their own SHGs managing credit and natural resources over which they have control (often barren fields of families who have migrated and with whom they enter into an agreement to develop the field and share the produce); these groups send representatives to a watershed committee. The larger farmers who are not given access to the projects resources are also invited to send representatives to this committee. MYRADA, however, has had to intervene to ensure that the landless form their own groups or are included in groups of marginal farmers where they are only a few; it has had to intervene so that they have access to natural resources like fuel  and fodder, and to credit to start businesses or other livelihood options. For the above reasons, MYRADA has found that it is more difficult to achieve and sustain the objective of equity in natural resource management programmes than it is in programmes where the self help groups managing credit form the building blocks of development strategy.

6. it projects a clear message that MYRADA will withdraw gradually as it hands over responsibilities to the SHGs , builds linkages with institutions required for continuing provision of goods, credit and services, and supports networks and apex societies among SHGs who opt for such support; the SHGs decide what responsibilities to give the Apex societies and maintain control over their functions. MYRADA realised that this message of withdrawal has to be given from the very beginning; further it had to be incorporated into MYRADA's intervention strategy which as a result gradually shifted from delivering services to individual poor families which as mentioned earlier tended to increase their dependence on MYRADA, towards promoting self help, institutional development, capacity building, linkages and networks. The strategy of withdrawal also influenced decisions regarding the technologies that were introduced during the project period. Technologies that could not be sustained by the skills absorbed by people or by the resources they were able to mobilise were avoided even though arguments for their technical soundness could not be faulted.

The strategy of forming Apex Societies is pursued with care. The SHGs have to decide whether they want to have such societies and what their roles will be. Attempts to rush into forming such societies by intermediary NGOs have resulted in these Apex Societies exercising control over the SHGs and in politicisation. MYRADA's experience indicates that SHGs prefer to form societies covering 8 to 10 SHGs which perform roles similar to Farmers Service Societies. In several projects Apex Societies covering a larger number of SHGs have been formed, but each SHG has representatives in the Apex Society; it is also noticed that the SHGs are reluctant to give Apex Societies covering a large number of groups, any funds or power to exercise control over funds. It is for these reasons that MYRADA does not fix a date before which the SHGs have to affiliate, but lets the process evolve. The SHGs must feel the need for Apex Societies to perform roles which they find difficult to do individually, or which MYRADA was performing before it begins to scale down its intervention.

7. it ensures that the groups have developed a habit of savings and investment, and the ability to mobilise capital. Though the Banks have changed their policy to allow direct lending to groups on the basis of their performance, there are several areas where there are no Banks at a convenient distance; MYRADA has had to set up a non-financial Banking Institution, `Sanghamithra', to advance loans directly to the groups.

Though MYRADA has acquired an advantage in comparison with the Government in achieving the objectives of sustainability and equity in programmes focused on the poor, it did not acquire this advantage easily or by the mere fact of being an NGO. Besides all projects do not possess this advantage equally. There were organisational features that MYRADA had to incorporate and constraints both within the organisation and without that it had to remove before it could acquire this advantage; maintaining it requires equal concern and investment in time and resources. Internally, MYRADA had to be constantly alive to the demands and directions established by its Mission and to attain a degree of self reliance to allow it the freedom to select the time, place and nature of its intervention. MYRADA learnt from its mistakes; for when it gave in to pressure to intervene in order to survive or in a manner beyond its resources it quickly lost its comparative advantage.

Though there is a strong empathy towards the poor and equity among the staff, sustainability is another matter; it is perceived by some of the staff as a threat to their own positions, power and jobs; a strategy to develop peoples institutions develop and gain in skills and confidence. For the staff to work whole-heartedly towards this objective they must continue to have a high degree of commitment which is difficult to ensure after a few years of service, and be assured that MYRADA has the leadership, vision and resources required to respond to new challenges and to needs in new areas; it also demands that they equip themselves with new skills since these challenges and needs may differ from the ones to which they were accustomed to, and that the organisation provides them with opportunities to do so. MYRADA has made efforts to respond to these needs. It has invested over Rs.5 million in staff training and capacity building over the last 10 years and provided opportunities for exposure to institutions and experiences both in India and abroad.

Unfortunately, MYRADA's involvement in development programmes is sought for reasons which are related to its effectiveness within the delivery mode of intervention and does not take into account its major comparative advantages in development strategy related to institution building, linkages and networks. The reasons Government officials give when approaching MYRADA to intervene are - a committed staff willing to stay in remote areas and to be with the people at times convenient to them, the organisations ability to respond  quickly to problems and needs and to be flexible. MYRADA's record of delivering services to the poor is also mentioned by a few senior officials who are committed to change and to the eradication of poverty. There were also several other reasons, mostly driven by the needs of Government or donors. In the Western Ghats Forestry Programme for example, MYRADA was first approached to channel Government funds to local NGOs and to coordinate their programme, a role that MYRADA refused to accept, and fortunately, had the freedom and space to redefine; but more about this later.

The Government, in general still views MYRADA and other civic groups as service delivery agents, or as turnkey operators, a role that MYRADA had to adopt in the Biogas programme. Besides, since the Government has no systems in place to work with NGOs, it characterises them as contractors; this further clouds the relationship. In the Drinking Water and Sanitation project, for example, MYRADA was asked by the Government to provide a Bank guarantee even though the role envisioned for NGOs did not involve purchase of material or construction.

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