2.3.What is an Institution?

In MYRADA the words "group", "institution" and "organisation" are often used interchangeably. However, there is a difference. MYRADA holds the position that a "group" is a gathering at one end of the spectrum, while an institution is an entity with particular features at the other end. The "organisation" comes in between. A group, is often a temporary gathering to achieve a particular purpose; it can develop (and does on occasions) into an organisation which has rules and regulations and defined functions; in most cases, however, these rules and functions are largely imposed from outside. An organisation develops into an institution when its members have full ownership of the body; where they have interiorised to a large extent the culture and systems that they (or others) have established. This is more easily achieved when the members have an active and effective say in drawing up the rules and regulations, in setting the agenda and building the culture that enables them to perform the functions that they choose. When the rules are drawn up by outsiders, the organisation can interiorise them adequately provided adequate training is provided to help it to develop its own vision and mission, and above all if the original rules are open to modification, addition and rejection; in most cases this is not the case.

An institution has a stable pattern of behaviour. Sanctions for deviant behaviour are not imposed from without, but are self imposed and accepted by all as necessary for the health and growth of the body. Conflict resolution is primarily the institution’s responsibility. There is no tension between a members rights and responsibilities; both are given equal weight and respected; in some crisis situations, responsibilities easily take precedence over rights. An institution has a culture for self assessment and change, it does not need to be "restructured" from outside; in the case of an organisation, the initiative to start a process of self-assessment usually comes from outside. Finally an "organisation" can function within a "totalitarian regime"; an institution can function only in a genuine democracy. An institution, therefore, grows over a period; it requires at least two to three years before a group begins to develop clear signs of an institution. It is also quite possible for a functioning institution to loose its culture and undermine its systems through external or internal causes. An institution therefore requires both time to develop as well as constant commitment of all its members to remain healthy. In short, it must develop its own vision, its own financial and organisational management systems, it own learning mechanisms and the confidence required to link up with others to protect its identity and independence.

2.4. Affinity : The Mission Statement does not contain the word "affinity" to describe peoples institutions,. This is because MYRADA fosters a variety of institutions, all of which do not require to be based on affinity, though there has to be a degree of mutual support among members. It is the institutions at the lowest level that need to be based on a high degree of affinity among the members. MYRADA also promotes institutions at a higher level like apex bodies and watershed associations. It is, however, the Self Help Groups which are peoples institution's at the lowest level. They are the base institutions in MYRADA's strategy for social transformation. The Mission statement uses the word "mutual trust" to describe the institutions that MYRADA's fosters. This "mutual trust" is required by all types of institutions; in the self help groups, however, it refers to "affinity". Affinity is based on mutual trust. It however goes beyond to include the complex set of relationships that exist among the members of a group and which is today referred to as "social capital".

Affinity exists even before any intervenor enters the scene. Identifying affinity, however, is no easy matter. It requires that intervenors unload the package they often carry - a package of predetermined criteria to select "beneficiaries", ideologies that tend to be absolutist and biases. The pressure to spend money and the growing trend to form village groups quickly and to invest them with funds to implement programmes must be resisted; such groupings tend to become the last link in the delivery chain; their members have little sense of affinity and ownership. Affinity will not be a major feature of a group if it is formed primarily to lobby for a particular objective or to implement any activity. The members may have one objective that is common to all, but there may also be several situations where their interests are in conflict. For example, all the people in the village may have a common objective to get a water system; here their interests coincide; but they may also be a set of oppressive relations based on money lending and labour; affinity cannot be based on these relationships.

Affinity is based on a set of inter-relationships among group members; mutual trust is perhaps the main source of these relationships. But there are also several other binding inter-relationships of support and inter-dependence as well as the systems that govern their activity and the culture that they develop; this set of relationships could be described as the SHGs "social capital" which provides the basis of its sustainability and the guarantee for any loans given to the SHG. These institutions give the poor space to grow in confidence and skills. This is turn helps them to reach out to forge links with other institutions, both formal and informal. Affinity can be strengthened by group perception of common threats from outside. It can be weakened if individual aspirations conflict with the groups common good.

The efforts to identify affinity groups often meet with several obstacles that arise from the way in which development programmes are conceived. It has become the fashion to base programmes or "schemes" on groups. People are brought together on the basis of criteria established by an external agency like an NGO or Government. These seldom develop into sustainable institutions. Further, the tendency in development programmes is to start by focusing on an activity rather than to identify a group whose members are willing to work together and to support each other. Such groups end up by being implementers of Government or NGO programmes; they collapse after the project is over (or often once the funds are disbursed).

While affinity is a necessary feature for sustainability, it is not adequate to achieve this objective. Taking off from this "affinity", the group needs to develop its own vision, organisational and financial accountability, learning mechanisms and linkages - all of which it interiorises over a period of time. The group - which develops the features of an institution - is in turn able to extend and sustain linkages with other institutions both formal and informal. It is able to do so because it gives the members a social identity; several studies have shown that once the group is able to mobilise people for common actions and to cope with emerging threats, it is respected by others in the village for its achievement based on its own efforts; it projects an image of a responsible institution with which others can deal.

Once they take off, the poor continue to need these institutions so that the objective of sustainability of the impact of investment can be achieved. As the group acquires an identity, it also attracts attention from other sectors of the village, some of whom suspect that their interests may be threatened if this group survives and grows in confidence. The group needs to be able to cope with these threats. MYRADA therefore does not focus only on identifying an affinity group. It realises that sustained effort is required for institution building if the impact is to be long lasting.

2.5. Appropriate Institutions :

The Mission statement further qualifies institutions by the word "APPROPRIATE".

Most institutions formed initially for single purposes suffer from over-load over a period of time. It is a common assumption that an institution in the rural area can be saddled will several responsibilities all of which it can implement effectively. MYRADA's experience indicates that this assumption is wrong. Milk societies at the village level have to collect a certain quantity of milk in order to make the milk route viable. To achieve this target, it has to include in its membership both rich and poor farmers who have dairy animals. The rich farmers have several animals; they make the route viable. In fact the small farmer with one or two animals rides on the back of the richer farmer. Both rich and poor are required to make the institution (milk societies) viable. However, if these societies are given the responsibility of managing credit, the richer (and more powerful families) will syphon off the major part and use credit to increase their control over the poor, as is common in Cooperative Societies. If credit is the resource to be managed, therefore, the appropriate institution cannot be one where rich and poor are members; it will have to be an institution where only the poor have membership, and which they own. If they do not own these institutions and instead have to conform to rules and regulations of the official financial systems, they will continue to be exploited. The SHGs are institutions of the poor; experience has shown that they are also the appropriate institutions to manage credit.

In the case of watershed management, a single institution is not adequate or appropriate. MYRADA's experience indicates that in a micro watershed of about 70 - 100 families,the initial intervention required is to form SHGs of the poor. Representatives from these SHGs as well as from other groups come together to form Watershed Associations. These Associations form ad hoc committees which, take the initiative to involve all concerned in every stage of the programme. The SHGs are in a position to lobby for the poorer sectors and to ensure that they have a share in the benefits of the investment.

A similar situation prevails in the case of Joint Forestry management Committees. The poor may attend meetings of the Committees but have little say in the proceedings. On the other hand it is the poor who depend on the forest for their livelihoods. MYRADA's strategy is to organise the poor into SHGs so that they are gradually able to play an effective role in the affairs of the Joint Forestry Management Committees. MYRADA's experience in forestry programmes in the Western Ghats indicates that the Joint Forestry Committees have captured some contracts, which formerly went to contractors, but the poor have hardly benefitted. Yet, it must be remembered that it is the poor who are primarily affected by forest closure which is being implemented in similar forestry projects.

The Joint Forestry Management Committee therefore may be appropriate institution to transfer power to the village but it is not an appropriate instrument to ensure that the poor share in the benefits.